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1The Return of the Art and Technology Lab
John Beck and Ryan Bishop
Abstract
In North America, there are currently over 100 programs and labs 
committed to collaborative experimentation in art and technology. 
This article examines the current prominence of art and technology 
labs in the context of the resurgence of collaborative practice in the 
arts, not only between artists, but also among a wide range of cross-
disciplinary groupings of designers, scientists, engineers, scholars 
and others. The push for collaboration in the arts is part of a 
recalibration of the meaning of 'research' as it is understood by arts 
practitioners, and among the legacies of institutional critique has 
been the expanded engagement of artists in a range of contexts 
that moves beyond galleries and museums and into, among other 
places, universities, businesses, science and tech labs and facilities. 
At the same time, the massive growth of the tech sector has given 
rise to a new generation of speculative research enterprise, from 
Google to SpaceX, which shares, to some degree, the expansive 
research and development (R&D) horizons of advanced art. Some of 
the most prominent current art and tech projects explicitly draw on 
the legacy of precursor programs from the 1960s to establish a 
lineage and to confer art historical legitimacy upon the new versions 
This article examines two current art and tech projects, at MIT and 
the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA), and their strategic 
deployment of their 1960s antecedents: respectively, Gyorgy Kepes’ 
Center for Advanced Visual Studies (CAVS) at MIT, and Maurice 
Tuchman's Art & Technology program (A&T) at LACMA. This 
examination argues the loss of a radical vision that preceded the 
1960s labs that rendered them untenable while exploring how the 
art and technology labs furthered a larger shift from progressive 
2liberalism to neoliberalism.  While these earlier projects were short-
lived and the targets of considerable criticism, not least due to their 
connections with military and corporate clients, in the twenty-first 
century the legacies of CAVS and A&T have been unproblematically 
reclaimed. Contemporary art and tech projects, we argue, are in 
danger of succumbing to the same techno-utopianism as their 
1960s iterations, as the same military-industrial allegiances that 
tainted the earlier projects continue to underpin twenty-first century 
collaborations. 
Keywords Keywords: Art and Technology Labs, US Avant-Garde, 
Cold War, MIT, LACMA, Experiments in Art and Technology
In October 1966, a series of performances titled 9 Evenings: Theatre and 
Engineering was held at the 69th Regiment Armory in New York City. The 
performances, which included the innovative deployment of closed-circuit 
television, fiber-optics and infra red cameras, sonar and wireless FM 
transmitters, involved ten artists and around thirty engineers. The project was 
led by Bell Labs scientist Billy Klüver and artist Robert Rauschenberg, and 
included contributions from John Cage, Yvonne Rainer, Robert Whitman, 
Steve Paxton, and others. Despite a mixed critical response, the collaboration 
prompted Klüver, Rauschenberg and Whitman, along with Klüver’s Bell Labs 
colleague Fred Waldhauer, to launch Experiments in Art and Technology 
(E.A.T.) in 1967, an organization intended to facilitate further collaborative 
projects among artists and engineers. At MIT in the same year, Bauhaus 
alumnus Gyorgy Kepes became the founding director of the Center for 
Advanced Visual Studies (CAVS), intended to hook artistic exploration into the 
massive scientific and technological resources of one of the country’s leading 
research universities through a program of fellowships and exhibitions. Also in 
1967, Los Angeles Museum of Modern Art curator Maurice Tuchman 
launched Art and Technology (A&T), a project designed to place artists with 
industrial partners in order to explore the possibilities for collaborative work, a 
3selection of which would be shown in a final exhibition at the museum. While 
these initiatives are representative of the widespread US techno-utopianism of 
the mid-1960s, where a powerful faith that the problems of society could be 
addressed by the proper deployment of expert intervention was backed up by 
unprecedented prosperity and the political will to build a Great Society, they 
also mark a turning point.1 Klüver’s ambitions for E.A.T. were not enough to 
encourage sponsors to adequately fund his plans; CAVS and A&T came 
increasingly under fire for their complicity with the defense establishment as 
resistance to the Vietnam War intensified (see, for example, Blakinger 2016; 
Goodyear 2004). By the early 1970s, technology was more often perceived as 
the enemy of democracy than the lever of emancipation and the oft-stated 
virtues of collaboration between art and technology had shaded into the more 
sinister implications of collaborationism. 2
Beyond their significance to the history of mid-twentieth century 
American art, what makes these projects compelling to consider now is that 
they have become touchstones in a revived interest in interdisciplinary art and 
technology collaboration. E.A.T. and A&T have recently been rebooted for the 
digital age, while CAVS is celebrated by MIT as the progenitor of its 
contemporary successes in media and technology research. Technology, 
once again, we are told, will relieve us from drudgery, accelerate the 
1 Early discussions of art and science in the 1960s include, for 
example, Benthall 1972 and David 1973. For more recent 
assessments, see Goodyear 2004. On CAVS, see Wisnioski 2013; 
Fred Turner tracks Rauschenberg and Cage from Black Mountain to 
EAT (Turner 2008); Kepes, CAVS and EAT are also explored in 
Halpern 2015, Chapter Two.
2 Matthew Wisnioski argues that US techno-optimism crested 
somewhere around 1964: "To be an American engineer in the 
aftermath of World War II had been to look upon a seemingly 
limitless future. While the idea that material progress inherently 
brings social progress always has had challengers, in the United 
States, the period from 1945 to 1964 was one of near-utopian belief 
in technology’s beneficence. Few denied that the nation was 
undergoing a scientific revolution, as popular imagery portrayed a 
futurist world of flying cars and plastic houses. In democracy’s 
name, engineers found government patronage on the frontiers of 
electronics, aeronautics, and nuclear power that swelled the 
profession’s ranks" (Wisnioski 2012: 3).
4realization of our desires and deliver us from dangers formed out of ignorance 
and outmoded precedent. From a twenty-first century vantage point, the 
many-acronymed 1960s art and tech initiatives provide a rich prehistory that 
conforms to and supports current notions of project-led, interdisciplinary, 
practice-led research and enterprise as the means through which a creative 
deployment of science and technology will innovate new social forms and new 
modes of understanding. While the earlier art and tech projects provides a 
ready model — and valuable archival resources — for their contemporary 
iterations, the political challenges faced by the 1960s projects, not to mention 
the politics that drove their original formation (albeit often largely implicitly), 
remains under explored, especially in relation to the current surge of interest 
in art and tech research. 
The institutions out of which E.A.T., CAVS and A&T emerged were 
deeply embedded in the fabric of Cold War liberalism, from the corporate 
power of Bell Labs and the military-industrial research university prowess of 
MIT to the ascendant defense and aerospace economies that supported the 
rise of LACMA as a powerhouse of Southern California high culture. Yet the 
social and political ambitions Klüver, Kepes and Tuchman had for their art and 
tech projects derive from an older version of liberalism that is grounded in 
Progressivism’s faith in the capacity of scientific expertise, broadly conceived, 
to ameliorate the corrosive social and economic effects of corporate 
capitalism. The collaborative interdisciplinary spirit animating 1960s art and 
tech certainly borrowed something from the shared project that galvanized 
American science and industry during World War II and which was formalized 
and generously funded during the Cold War, but this security-driven model 
was itself an adaptation of the collective creative spirit that characterized the 
New Deal, on one hand, and, on the other, the utopianism of experiments in 
progressive education developed at institutions like Black Mountain College in 
North Carolina from the 1930s to the 1950s. Black Mountain, under Bauhaus 
veteran Josef Albers, fused the social utopianism of the German design 
school with the progressive liberalism of American philosopher John Dewey 
and became a crucial node in an emerging network of sites, such as Rutgers 
University, situated in New Brunswick, New Jersey, a few miles from the Bell 
5Labs campus and a hotbed of Fluxus activity, through which artists committed 
to collaborative experiment, such as Cage and Rauschenberg, circulated. It is 
through émigrés like Albers, Kepes, and Fluxus guru George Macunias that 
the European historical avant-garde combined with US technophilia and 
progressive politics. The process-oriented, collective, socially utopian reading 
of modernity shared by these two strains provided the platform upon which 
the 1960s art and tech projects built. 3
The capacious reading of science and democracy offered by liberals 
like Dewey and by the Bauhaus, whereby science stood for a generalized 
stance of unbiased, egalitarian engagement with the world, however, was 
severely curtailed following World War II as the managerial imperatives of 
Cold War security policy sought to protect its elite scientists and persuade the 
general population that the rising standard of living was the yield delivered by 
increasingly obstruse, and expensive, scientific specialization. By the time 
E.A.T., CAVS and A&T emerged as the institutionalized realization of the 
Bauhaus-progressivist stance, the structures and values necessary for the 
construction of a civic modernity based on the realization of human creativity 
through technology were already unsupportable in the US.
The fact that E.A.T., A&T and CAVS have found a new significance in 
the twenty-first century is not because the collectivist techno-utopia promised 
by the Bauhaus or Black Mountain has somehow, finally, become the goal of 
American cultural and corporate institutions; it is because the collaborative, 
project-based, time-limited interdisciplinary activity advanced by those 
progressive organizations has been thoroughly integrated into the corporate 
3 Kepes worked at Moholy-Nagy's New Bauhaus in Chicago before 
moving to MIT in 1946; Josef Albers taught at Black Mountain 
College from 1933 to 1949, where his students included 
Rauschenberg, among others; Buckminster Fuller taught at both the 
Chicago Bauhaus and Black Mountain. On the importance of the 
Bauhaus in the US, see Achim Borchardt-Hume 2006; Grawe 2000; 
Kentgens-Craig 1999; Vallye 2011. On Black Mountain, see 
Duberman 1974; Díaz 2015. For a sense of Dewey's position, see, 
for example, Dewey 1916; Dewey 1938. For an overview of Dewey's 
significance to US political and intellectual life, see Westbrook 1991.
6world. Indeed, the virtues of innovation, creativity, adaptability and 
collaboration are so widely promoted in the twenty-first century that they no 
longer refer to the capabilities of scientific or artistic elites but serve as the 
guiding imperatives of everyday social and economic life under neoliberal 
capital. The story of the ambitions of E.A.T., A&T and CAVS, their limitations, 
and their resuscitation in the present moment, is one that provides an outline 
of the way the collectivist techno-utopianism of the early twentieth century has 
been restructured as neoliberal orthodoxy. The 1960s art and tech labs mark 
a turning point — the point at which Cold War corporate liberalism provides 
the medium for the conversion of the collectivist avant-garde into the 
precarious labor of the twenty-first century creative class.
Looking Backward
In 2013, LACMA launched the Art + Technology Lab (a plus sign has been 
substituted for the old media "and" of the 1960s version), intended to provide, 
as the Museum website explains, "grants, in-kind support, and facilities at the 
museum to develop prototype projects." Sponsored by Hyundai, the program 
benefits from the staff and facilities of big tech companies Accenture, Daqri, 
Nvidia, Gensler, Google, and SpaceX. Artists are promised "access to 
robotics, EEG, sensors, big data-crunching machines, and even SpaceX flight 
information." In 2015, MIT’s Center for Art, Science and Technology (CAST) 
received a $1.5 million Mellon Foundation grant to further promote and enable 
the center’s mission to inspire teaching, research and programming that 
operate at the experimental intersections of art, science and engineering. In 
the official MIT news article about the grant, the Institute stressed its fifty 
years of pioneering work integrating the arts into its engineering and science 
programs. The news release explicitly links the CAST project of “arts on a 
civic scale” back to Gyorgy Kepes’ CAVS, which it identifies as the progenitor 
of CAST’s studio/lab ambitions. In 2016, Nokia Bell Labs marked the fifty-year 
anniversary of Billy Klüver’s art and technology collaboration by introducing 
the E.A.T. Salon, bringing together a wide range of artists and Bell Labs 
researchers. E.A.T., according to Marcus Weldon, President of Nokia Bell 
Labs and CTO of Nokia, in his welcoming address, “has been a little dormant 
7for past decades, because in many ways the ideas were so ‘avant-garde’ that 
they were ahead of their time.” Now, however, with the “rise of smartphones 
and their canonical apps, cloud based creative software platforms, 
sophisticated digital image capture devices, and immersive, large scale digital 
displays or head-mounted VR goggles, art and technology are becoming truly 
coupled, or perhaps even symbiotic.” The "time to EAT,” writes Weldon, “has 
come” (Weldon: online).
Interest in collaborative arts-and-technology research has 
never been higher, and the LACMA initiative, along with the CAST 
grant and the E.A.T. Salon, are among many indicators of the trend 
in the arts toward interdisciplinary collaboration and the notion of 
art as research.4 Indeed, there are over 100 such programs and 
sites in the US alone at the time of writing (see Shanken 2005; 
Wisnioski & Zacharias 2014). Reawakened interest in art and tech 
labs is a consequence, on one hand, of the enlargement of art's field 
of operations post-conceptual art, and on the other, of the 
restructuring of the technology sector in the wake of the digital 
revolution. For art historian John Roberts, since conceptual art, or 
what he calls, following Rosalind Krauss, "art after art in the 
expanded field," the collective, reflexive strategies of the avant-
garde have become "the grammar of a viable and active art 
production." Art, he goes on, "is now represented by an 
unprecedented range of material, immaterial and temporal 
activities," ranging from the purely ideational and theoretical, 
through performative, virtual, participatory, and environmental 
engagements that are often "far removed from official institutional 
approbation -- even if many public institutions are obliged to draw 
on these changes in order to make sense of artistic change and stay 
in the game" (Roberts 2015:21).5
4 On collaboration, see Green 2001; Kester 2011; Kester 2013.
5  The propensity among artists and curators during the 1990s to 
describe the museum or gallery as a laboratory is discussed in 
Bishop 2004.
8This expansive plurality of forms has emerged as the official 
art world of global stars, blockbuster exhibits, elite institutions and 
dealerships has increasingly rendered itself irrelevant to the 
concerns and interests of a critical art practice, even though, as 
Roberts suggests, there is no clear-cut or complete separation 
between the art world and the enlarged sector of art workers he 
designates art's "second economy" (23). The vigorous growth since 
the 1990s of participatory and other discursive and pedagogic 
practice cannot be separated, then, from the deregulated labour 
market under neoliberalism that has demanded increased worker 
flexibility, adaptability and entrepreneurialism. The model here is, of 
course, the tech sector, its countercultural bona fides undergirded 
by the deregulated market and its capacity to create new modes of 
cultural production and exchange.6
The explicit positioning of initiatives like CAVS, A&T and E.A.T. 
as the germinal ground for twenty-first century projects marks, 
then, not only a recognition of the ways the histories of art and 
technology share a common, if not untroubled, recent history, but it 
is also an indication of the ways in which the repositioning of 
historical legacies can legitimate current practice. The revived 
projects spend little time reflecting on the limitations and failures of 
their predecessors, which instead appear rejuvenated after a long 
6 The key figure here is Stewart Brand. The fluid transition from 
social to market emancipation is deftly explored in Turner 2006. The 
relationship between participatory, pedagogic, and other discursive 
modes of art and new technologies is clear in Nicolas Bourriaud's 
influential notion of "relational aesthetics," where the DIY, 
interactive promise of the internet is transferred to the production 
and reception of art: "Nowadays, modernity extends into the 
practices of cultural do-it-yourself and recycling, into the invention 
of the everyday and the development of time lived, which are not 
objects less deserving of attention and examination than 
Messianistic utopias and the forma 'novelties' that typified 
modernity yesterday." (Bourriaud 2002: 14). For the critical 
response to Bourriaud, see, for example, Bishop 2004; Martin, 2007.
9period of benign dormancy and ready to provide a retro-futurist 
underpinning to initiatives now able to claim themselves as part of a 
half century tradition. 
This historicizing move is one of the ways that current art and 
tech labs significantly differ from their precursors, where the 
retrospective shoring up of the archive as evidence of a legitimating 
precedent is markedly absent. In the Cold War moment of the 1960s 
art and tech labs, the temporal perspective was that of the New 
Frontier, a world of the future that left behind the traumas of the 
recent past (the Depression, World War II) and cast an unblinking 
eye on the horizon ahead. The current retrospective move, of 
course, is entirely consistent with the retemporalized history of the 
avant-garde, where each iteration must reflexively include 
knowledge of its precursors. What is downplayed in the 
foregrounding of the 1960s art and tech legacy, though, is precisely 
the extent to which, and the reasons why, those projects were 
unable to deliver on their utopian collaborative promise. In other 
words, the claims made now by, respectively, MIT, LACMA, and 
Nokia for CAVS, A&T, and E.A.T. at once retrieve and construct a 
prehistory of the art and tech lab that resists a full investigation of 
the complex interplay among art, technology, institutions and 
business that shaped and troubled the Cold War-era labs and 
continues to determine, despite their depoliticized self-presentation, 
their contemporary descendents. This is akin to a neo-constructivist 
avant-garde addressing the history of the Russian avant-garde 
without accounting for Stalin. 
While the A&T program, for example, successfully attracted 
high profile artists and paired them with the industrial giants of the 
SoCal tech sector, many of the collaborations choked or fizzled out 
and the resulting exhibition was poorly received and drew heavy 
fire.  The current A+T initiative is shrewd enough to establish some 
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distance from the original model, claiming it is "inspired by the 
spirit" of A&T but is much less wedded to the reliance on art stars 
and the climactic exhibit and more committed to facilitating open-
ended exploration conducted by artists recruited through 
competitive open calls. What A+T has preserved of the original 
project, aside from hooking up with major tech players, is the stress 
on documentation. It is largely through the publication that resulted 
from Tuchman's initiative (and which served as the catalogue for 
the 1971 LACMA show), knowingly given the flat bureaucratic title A 
Report on the Art & Technology Program of the Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art, 1967-1971, that the original program has gained art 
historical traction and from which the current A+T project derives 
much of its inspiration (Tuchman 1971).  The new lab, the LACMA 
website explains, is "inspired by the transparency" of the original 
program and offers full digital disclosure of all the lab’s work, 
"including code and data, essays, event and lecture transcripts, 
images and video, legal documents, project websites, proposals, 
reports and more." Included in this archive, of course, is a PDF 
version of the 1971 Report.
The appeal to transparency is an oddly preemptive move, as if 
the museum anticipates accountability to be an issue it must 
address from the outset. As will become clear, among the problems 
encountered by the 1960s labs was growing suspicion of the 
projects as a means of softening the public face of corporate 
military-industrial enterprise, especially as opposition to the 
Vietnam War intensified and become more widespread toward the 
end of the decade.7 By flagging "transparency," A+T forecloses on 
any charge that its intentions might be anything other than in the 
spirit of open exploration and knowledge exchange. Yet the very 
7 On the impact of the Vietnam War on the US art world, see 
Frascina 1999. For a discussion of LACMA and Vietnam, see 
Goodyear 2008; Kahn 2012; Lee 2004: 9-25.
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claim to transparency calls up questions of opacity and concealment 
and draws attention to the regulation of the archive as a primary 
means through which legitimacy can be instantiated and sustained. 
What has become periodized in histories of the postwar period 
as the "paranoid" 1970s -- the widespread and broad-ranging 
suspicion of institutions crystallized by Watergate and articulated 
through a conflation of all unseen powers into the catch-all notion of 
the "system" -- is inevitably invoked through A+T's alignment with 
its precursor program, which to a large extent fell foul of the surging 
anti-technology, anti-institutional sensibility that accompanied 
resistance to Vietnam.8 While A+T does not address in detail the 
context of the original A&T Program, it does benefit from a 
prophylactic move that brackets off dissent in order to seal in the 
critical heat generated by the 1971 exhibit. In this way, LACMA's 
celebration of A&T's exemplary transparency operates as a firewall 
in at least two ways. First, it separates the earlier program from the 
"system" it was charged, at the time, with being part of and 
beholden to, making A&T safe as a precursor. Second, that original 
transparency can be presented as part of the legacy on which the 
new iteration builds, while filtering out the malware of history that 
might otherwise corrupt the archive.
This is not to say that CAVS, A&T or E.A.T. are somehow 
inappropriate models for collaborations in art and technology. What 
we are suggesting is that the recuperation of the 1960s labs that is 
being undertaken in order to situate contemporary projects as part 
of an ongoing history of collaborative practice does not tell the full 
8 The volte face in US attitudes toward technology in the mid-1960s 
was sudden and widespread. See Wisnioski (2012: 4): "[the new 
critical consensus claimed that] as a result of technological 
imperatives -- not just the accretion of material inventions but the 
systematic interlocking of artifacts, organizations, and patterns of 
efficient behavior -- contemporary life was becoming more 
alienating, more destructive, more totalitarian, and less human."
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story, since it avoids the broader context within which the utopian 
energies that fueled the original projects were already out of line 
with the emaciated public sphere of their managerial Cold War 
moment. Furthermore, a properly historicized understanding of art 
and tech labs must also account for the continuities, as well as the 
differences, between the earlier labs and their contemporary 
versions. The kind of accountability inadvertently flagged by 
LACMA's promise of transparency would do well to recognize the 
vexed relationship between the artistic and military-industrial avant-
gardes that rendered the 1960s projects politically untenable 
despite their often radical underpinning in movements committed to 
a restructuring of the relation between art and life. Yet this enlarged 
consideration of what art and technology collaboration might look 
like outside its corporate managerial frame is hardly possible when 
the twenty-first century art and tech labs are as networked into the 
military-industrial-entertainment complex as their Cold War 
predecessors, this time without the residual, and to an extent 
redemptive, vanguardism. 
It is true that the 1960s projects had different aims from the 
outset. CAVS was intended, to an extent, to redeem the research 
university through an injection of the arts into the heavily 
instrumentalized world of Cold War science and technology. In his 
CAVS pitch to the university, Kepes (though clearly writing to 
university administrators) suggested that art might heal what 
military-industrial applications of science had wrought asunder, 
arguing that “a place for the visual arts in a scientific university is 
imperative for a reunification of Man’s outlook on life’" (Kepes 
quoted in Ragain 2012). Klüver, more at home in the corporate 
world, imagined E.A.T. as an organization that, if successful, would 
dissolve along with the disciplinary distinctions it set out to 
challenge. The LACMA program, among the three projects 
considered here, was perhaps the most obviously interested in 
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courting business and integrating the museum into the broader Los 
Angeles enterprise zone.9 To varying degrees, though, each of the 
projects remained wedded to a notion of arts and technology 
collaboration that had little to say about politics and relied on a set 
of (already old-fashioned and often naive) working assumptions 
about objectivity and disinterested attention in research and artistic 
practice that left them unable to adequately confront the Cold War 
contradictions of their respective enterprises. Social constructionism 
came too late to help CAVS, E.A.T. and A&T.
In spite of Kepes' progressive ambitions for CAVS, however, 
from its inception the Center was beset by challenges. When Kepes 
was asked to curate the American pavilion at the 1969 Sao Paolo 
Bienale, he wanted the show, echoing pavilion work by the Eames 
Office and the State Department a decade earlier, to be half 
“information” and half “community."10 But whereas the previous 
9 Many of the participating corporations for A&T were aerospace 
companies (Lockheed, Pan American, Jet Propulsion Laboratory), 
major players in computing (Hewlett-Packard, IBM), entertainment 
(Universal, 20th Century Fox) and electronics (Ampex, Philco-Ford), 
as well as construction (Kaiser Steel, American Cement) and think-
tanks like RAND and Herman Kahn's Hudson Institute (perhaps the 
most geographically distant of the sponsors, since Kahn moved from 
RAND's Santa Monica base in the early 1960s to lead his own 
consultancy in upstate New York) -- the organizations that built Cold 
War America.
10 The California-based Eames Office, famous for its multimedia 
commissions for global fairs promoting US state and corporate 
interests, operated as a futurist humanities-IT-media-arts lab avant 
la lettre. Closely resembling CAVS (itself a precursor to the MIT 
Media Lab, founded by Kepes’ student Nicholas Negroponte in 
1985), the Eames Office fused fine art, design, information theory, 
media and technological experimentation to pedagogy, as if their 
synergistic relationship among lab, studio, state and corporation 
could serve as a model for America's Cold War vision of itself as 
agent of political and creative emancipation. Unlike CAVS, the 
Eames Office, served no single institution or constituency, but 
parallels between these two enterprises are nonetheless useful, not 
least in the ways they reveal how the dormant (or even 
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exhibitions were mostly feted for their combination of technological 
progress as indicative of social progress (actual or potential), Kepes’ 
CAVS-generated exhibitions in Washington and elsewhere became 
targets of hostile criticism, including from artists invited by CAVS to 
participate.11 The LACMA project experienced the same problem. By 
the time the concluding exhibition opened in 1971, what utopian 
spirit there might have been in the original ambitions for the project 
were unable to withstand the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon, the 
shooting of students at Kent State. The idea that US corporations 
could plausibly collaborate with artists to create new worlds of social 
progress was now evidence of complicity and corruption -- 
technology was the problem and not the solution. The LACMA 
exhibition was taken apart in the art press, notably by Jack Burnham 
(Kepes' inaugural research fellow at CAVS) and Max Kosloff in 
Artforum and by David Antin in ARTnews (Burnham 2015; Kozloff 
1971; Antin 2011). The reviews by Burnham and Antin both flagged 
the "corporate" in their titles -- "Corporate Art" (Burnham 2015: 
184); "Art and the Corporations" (Antin 2011:61) -- while Kozloff, in 
a review Burnham would later call "the most vicious, inflammatory, 
and irrational attack ever written on the art and technology 
phenomenon," (Burnham 1980: 210) called his response "The 
Multimillion Dollar Art Boondoggle" (Kozloff 1971:72).
Burnham, for one, was clear that the problem with the Art and 
Technology show was timing: 
If presented five years ago, A&T would have been difficult to 
refute as an important event, posing some hard questions 
extinguished) energies of the pre-war European avant-gardes are 
rekindled in the Cold War US. 
11 Criticizing the proposed Brazilian exhibit, for example, Robert 
Smithson wrote Kepes that ‘‘The team spirit’ of the exhibition could 
be seen as endorsement of NASA Operations Control Room with all 
its crew-cut teamwork [...]. If one wants teamwork he should join 
the army. A panel called ‘What’s Wrong with Technological Art?’ 
might help" (Smithson 1996): 36.
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about the future of art. Given the effects of a Republican 
recession, the role of large industry as an intransigent 
beneficiary of an even more intractable federal government, 
and the fatal environmental effects of most of our technologies, 
few people are going to be seduced by three months of 
industry-sponsored art -- no matter how laudable the initial 
motivation. (Burnham 2015: 67)
Recognizing an element of posturing in the outrage of artists 
working with industry, Burnham notes "it is permissible to have your 
fabrication done by a local sheet-metal shop, but not by Hewlett-
Packard" (2015: 66-67). For Kozloff, it is precisely the easy 
seduction of money and power that is so contemptible about the 
project: even as the country is falling apart, he writes, "the 
American artists did not hesitate to freeload at the trough of that 
techno-fascism that had inspired them" (1971: 72). Even Burnham 
admits there was "something grossly immodest" about the amounts 
of money poured into the project and is also skeptical of the notion 
that corporations had any interest in genuine research symbiosis 
between art and industry -- at best, he thought, companies might 
get a bit of good publicity for appearing "forward looking." 
The A&T Report refers to seventy-six participating artists. 
Most were well-known; more than half were based in New York; 
fifteen were European (or working in Europe); eighteen were local 
LA artists.  All of the artists were men.12 The fourteen who exhibited 
at LACMA in 1971 were largely high-profile stars, including R.B. 
Kitaj, Roy Lichtenstein, Claes Oldenburg, Robert Rauschenberg, 
Richard Serra, and Andy Warhol. Only twenty-eight out of the 
seventy-six were placed in residencies; those who did not make it 
into the show either were not finished in time, ran out of money, 
12 The lack of diversity among A&T artists and the prioritizing of New 
York art stars over local talent meant that the protests against A&T 
were not just about complicity with the military-industrial complex.
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never planned to produce work to exhibit, or had fallen out with 
their sponsor.
Tuchman's report is perhaps the most interesting and 
enduring outcome of the LACMA project, a document Antin was 
already calling in his 1971 review a work of "conceptual art." The 
Report presents the business case, the contracts, the list of 
companies and their logos, the works completed and, more 
revealingly, the incomplete, the impossible, the miscommunication, 
and the breakdown of relations (most dramatically illustrated, 
perhaps, in John Chamberlain's bizarre dealings with RAND). This 
attempt at full disclosure presents as strange a view of the collision 
of the 1960s art world and the military-industrial corporate world as 
might be imagined. Like many botched experiments, missed 
opportunities, or heroic failures, it is probably more exciting and 
inspirational -- at least in retrospect -- than any achieved 
collaboration. The LACMA Report is like a bootleg of the Beach Boys' 
Smile sessions or the drawings for Jodorowsky's unmade film of 
Frank Herbert's Dune -- an unrealized dreamwork, forever 
incomplete but full of promise.
The revived A+T program is not unaware of this aura, which is 
why the website promises to collect the archive of the new project 
online, almost acknowledging the fact that the 1960s project 
presented itself best and most fulsomely through its documentation. 
It would not, indeed, be remarkable if it turned out that A+T is 
inspired more by the Report than by Tuchman's project itself. The 
Report has all the seductions of the archive and none of the 
messiness of the workshop, laboratory or boardroom. Certainly, no 
small part of the function of the revived lab is, as we have 
suggested, to promote and trade on the historical value now 
ascribed to the original. The new lab has a ready-made prehistory 
(or, at least, a prehistory in the process of ongoing curation by 
LACMA), a line-up of (now, if not already at the time) celebrated 
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past contributors, and an in-house archive to draw upon. Art and 
Technology '71 might have been a failure but that is now part of the 
story (though down-played, as are the politics that made it fail). In 
fact, even past failures can be absorbed into the narrative of Art and 
Technology as itself a process; 1971 might until recently have been 
considered a terminal point in a short-lived experiment but can now 
be reconfigured as an innovative test-run for a reinvigorated 
enterprise.
Moving Forward
The 2011 White Paper on the Arts at MIT and the 2015 celebration 
of CAST also make much of the institution's illustrious heritage. The 
White Paper cites a long, impressive (and exhausting) legacy of 
technological development from MIT that has shaped twentieth- and 
twenty-first century perception and aesthetics. The following list is 
no doubt intended to overwhelm any possible dissent: 
strobe photography (1930s), the instant camera (1948), high–
fidelity loudspeakers (1950s), the first interactive video game, 
"Spacewar" (1961),
 
the first television image transmitted by 
communications satellite – the letters “MIT” (1962), sound 
synchronization for portable video cameras (1970s), the alcove 
hologram (1986). The spirit of improvisation and urgency at the 
"Rad Lab" (MIT Radiation Laboratory) during World War II and 
later incarnations of the "Magical Incubator" spread to many 
explorations of art, engineering, science and computation at 
MIT, notably in Berenice Abbott’s scientific photographs for the 
Physical Science Study Committee beginning in 1958; Minor 
White’s refinement of the Zone System for black-and-white 
photographic processing from 1965 on; the Film section (later 
Film and Video) formed by Richard (“Ricky”) Leacock and 
Edward Pincus in the late 1960s; The Center for Advanced 
Visual Studies (CAVS), established by György Kepes in 1967; 
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the Architecture Machine group founded by Nicholas 
Negroponte in 1967; The Studio for Experimental Music, set up 
by Barry Vercoe in 1973; the Visible Language Workshop 
created by Muriel Cooper and Ron MacNeil in 1975; and of 
course the merging of many of these investigative streams in 
the Media Lab, opened in 1985. There the exploration of 
interactive systems for computational graphics, film, music, 
narrative, and performance flourished. (Arts at MIT 2011: 4)
All current thinking about arts-and-science labs, the White Paper 
suggests, essentially stems from CAVS, which codified and localized 
within an experimental space devoted to interdisciplinary 
exploration what had previously been disparate or ad hoc. The Rad 
Lab had its “urgency” due to the war effort that, under Vannevar 
Bush, aligned governmental, military, corporate and university 
resources and research. With the nation embroiled in an ongoing, 
though cold, conflict when Kepes started CAVS, the time for 
routinizing these sites of problem-solving and innovation seemed to 
have arrived. The same inference can be made from the White 
Paper in relation to the twenty-first century: another moment of 
human precarity needs experimental solutions that yoke art, 
science, and technology together. “Propelled by the founding of 
CAVS in 1967 and the opening of the Media Lab in 1985,” the paper 
argues, “universities, museums, and cultural organizations 
worldwide have sought to bring together the culture of the studio 
and the scientific research lab in various experimental settings. MIT 
is uniquely positioned to exercise leadership and sustain innovation 
in this area” (14). CAVS now serves as a model for art-science, 
studio-lab collaborations, according to the White Paper, which posits 
Kepes’ center as the ur-organization that establishes this formal 
arrangement (24-5).
The 2011 White Paper on the Arts at MIT also touts the CAST 
aspirational and institutional line of thinking, stating at the outset 
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that the university is committed to the “experimentation, risk-taking 
and imaginative problem-solving” that the aesthetic and social 
dimensions of the arts provides. Invoking the university’s motto 
“mens et manus” to justify support for the arts at a leading science 
and tech research institution, the position paper states that the arts 
are essential to the university’s “mission to build a better society” 
and meet “the challenges of the 21st Century” (iv). These 
sentiments clearly echo those espoused by Kepes, and the White 
Paper, in looking forward, looks to its past when it argues that all 
current and potential thinking about arts-and-science labs at the 
institute essentially stems from the Bauhaus-inflected CAVS (24-5). 
In spite of the rhetorical equivalence given to technological, 
scientific and artistic research, the university document explains 
“that MIT students want to create useful things that will make a 
difference in the world, but many of them want to make things that 
are beautiful, provocative and arresting too.” To clarify the point 
subtly made in the previous sentence, it states “such things also 
make a difference in the world” (v). The necessity to underscore 
that instrumental and aesthetic developments can both contribute 
to progress seems striking given the purpose of the White Paper. 
However, as with Kepes’ rather blatant appeal to set up CAVS that 
was published in the special issue of Daedalus some sixty years 
earlier than the White Paper, the audience for the art and 
technology alliance here is, once again, university trustees whose 
operating assumptions about the instrumental advantages of art 
versus technology certainly favor the latter. Now the trustees are 
also keeping an eye on a bottom line driven by market demands 
because the Cold War federal largesse is as much a thing of the 
past as is Kepes’ communal goals for the betterment of society as 
an end in itself. This decided distinction is articulated in the White 
Paper’s executive summary by linking the import of “research at the 
intersections of art, science and engineering” to MIT’s “competitive 
advantage” with such research that will “determine the artistic and 
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performative languages of the 21st century” (v). Such determination 
of these languages, one assumes, will translate into furthering the 
university’s “competitive advantage” as well as additional funds for 
CAST and its institutional host. 
In arguing for more archival work to be done for CAVS-based 
research in the present, the White Paper argues the CAVS materials 
“document the process of collaboration itself, considered so crucial 
to breakthrough innovation today” (24). Linking CAVS to the wildly 
successful Media Lab, the White Paper positions each as a “salon 
des refuses” composed of those who fell between disciplines and 
even institutions (25). Supporting and bringing together otherwise 
anomalous individuals in this kind of experimental site, the White 
Paper implies, is how to cook up breakthrough innovation, thus 
advancing knowledge and society (as well as profit). What is 
effective about this sort of narrative is how it foregrounds the 
anomalous, creative, interdisciplinary types attracted to projects like 
CAVS even as it remains embedded within the normative 
organizational values of the neoliberal university. 
The new A+T lab also seems comfortable enough reproducing 
the political blind spot that so antagonized critics in the 1970s. For 
example, discussing John Craig Freeman’s project “EEG AR: Things 
We Have Lost,” founder and CEO of DAQRI Brian Mullins enthuses 
about the ease of the collaboration because “the relationship 
between technologist and artist is extremely fluid as both are 
constantly pushing the limits of what’s possible in both of their 
mediums, which is pretty exciting.  It opens up the possibilities for 
all kinds of interesting innovation.” Freeman follows up by stating 
such apparently easy collaborations are really a matter of sorting 
out transactional relations within the innovation economy when he 
claims that “although there is an inherent tension between the 
proprietary, often secret, profit motivation of successful technology 
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companies and the public service mission of large institutions like 
LACMA, the Art + Technology Lab seems committed to exploring 
and possibly overcoming this tension.” Freeman expresses his belief 
that the success or otherwise of art and technology collaborations 
hinges on “how fluid the roles between artists and technologist are, 
and on how willing each party is to freely share intellectual 
property” ("Art, Technology, and Collaboration" 2016: online). 
Despite Freeman’s blunt explanation of the real stumbling block in 
the current collaborative configuration, he brings the short interview 
around to his work and its content as well as its artistic lineage. The 
role that chance plays in the augmented reality work he produced 
with DAQRI, according to Freeman, connects to Duchamp’s “Three 
Standard Stoppages” and John Cage’s experiments with the I Ching, 
thus throwing down the project’s avant-garde bona fides while 
securing chance a spot in a world in which memories are 
materialized on screens through brain wave visualization 
technologies in both his specific piece and in the technologies 
DAQRI is pursuing generally. Mullins, for his part, speculates on the 
increased interest in the tools on display as potentially leading to 
cheaper and better quality machines and software. It is fitting that 
Freeman invokes the Duchamp work because the term stoppage 
refers to tailoring and a technique for invisible repair of a garment. 
As with the Cold War moment of the LACMA A&T program, the 
return to these sites as ones meant to generate something novel for 
the participants, the sponsors and society (or at least the economy) 
– to invisibly repair the tear in the larger social fabric. 
The shadow of the "system" that besmirched the 1971 A&T 
program is not so readily apparent in the 2013 reboot, but that is 
partly because military-industrial research and development is now 
more likely to buy in innovation from ambitious private sector firms 
than to rely on Cold War corporate giants like Lockheed or Boeing. A 
2014 Reuters article, for example, reports that "the Pentagon has 
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switched from taking the lead in developing technologies like GPS 
satellites and now looks to commercial players for innovations like 
3-D printing" (Shalal 2014). Former Raytheon chief engineer Andy 
Lowery explains in the article how defense suppliers are adopting 
virtual reality technologies to cut costs, and smaller, more 
commercially oriented firms are quicker to utilize such technologies. 
Lowery is president of DAQRI, a VR software company currently 
marketing the "Smart Helmet," promoted as the "World’s First 
Wearable Human Machine Interface," and one of LACMA's Art + 
Technology sponsors. The example Lowery offers of a lithe new 
player in the defense business is Space Exploration Technologies, or 
SpaceX, Elon Musk's company that in 2015 beat Lockheed and 
Boeing to win its first defense contract (an Air Force GPS satellite) 
(Isadore 2015). SpaceX is another LACMA sponsor. Hyundai, the 
major sponsor of the Art + Technology program, includes the 
Hyundai WIA corporation which produces remote weapons systems 
for global markets (as part of its deal with LACMA, Hyundai funded 
the acquisition of works by Robert Irwin and James Turrell, both of 
whom featured in the original A&T) (Tewksbury 2015). Nvidia 
produces military-grade supercomputer chips; the architecture giant 
Gensler's client-base, needless to say, includes defense and 
aerospace interests.
None of this is a revelation, any more than it was news in 
1971 that A&T's sponsors were in the defense business. LACMA's 
claim of "transparency," then and now, is not much of a claim 
(though there is often a certain luster to be attained through overt 
displays of integrity, as in Google's by-now notorious "don't be evil" 
pronouncement). The new LACMA project does not acknowledge the 
problems of the 1971 program, as if Burnham's "bad timing" 
assessment explains away the fate of the original A&T program. 
When, after all, would be the right time to launch an art and 
technology project underwritten by military-industrial companies? 
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There is little evidence now, or then, that modes of technology 
might be imagined that emerge in contexts that are not produced 
out of the capitalist marketplace. Indeed, now that companies know 
how to work with museums, the fit between museum and 
corporation is more seamless, fluid, and mutually supportive that it 
appeared in 1971, when the besuited, middle aged white executives 
looked so clearly misaligned with the hairy, young white male artists 
on the cover of Tuchman's Report. A+T is no boondoggle for 
Hyundai and the other sponsors but a means of aligning their 
brands with the entrepreneurialism and risk-taking that are now 
considered as desirable in artists as they are in start-up companies. 
In fact, in the new iterations of Cold War-era art and tech labs, there 
is no real friction at all -- technology and art are no longer the 
separate spheres there were once seen to be; indeed, the art and 
tech lab is increasingly part of the public face of "normal science," 
to borrow from Kuhn. Or, to shift register only slightly: business as 
usual. It may still be the case, as Burnham suggests, that industry 
has nothing much to learn from the "research" of artists that it 
cannot find out for itself, but unless the new art and tech labs can 
find ways of interrogating their institutional underpinning (not to 
mention their funding streams), the terms "art" and "technology" 
are likely to remain, in the end, normative.
Art and Technology Labs Past and Present
CAVS, E.A.T. and A&T all drew, in one form or another, on the 
accumulated history of the avant-garde and these projects mark 
some of the ways early twentieth century art took root in the US.13 
13 Albers at Black Mountain and Kepes at MIT signal the transference 
of Bauhaus utopianism to an American context; Ray Eames studied 
abstract painting in New York City during the 1930s with German 
émigré Hans Hoffman; the teenage George Maciunas arrived from 
Lithuania in 1948; long-settled in the US, Duchamp became an 
American citizen in 1955; the first Duchamp retrospective was held 
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There was always more than one neo-avant-garde and the political 
and aesthetic commitments of the various branches and tributaries 
fragment and splinter accordingly. If there is a thread of continuity 
across these projects, though, it lies in the serious investigation of 
the prospects for art as a mode of practice directly engaged in the 
production of new forms of living. To this extent, the spark of the 
historical avant-garde keeps firing in studios, workshops, and 
laboratories across the US during the 1950s and 1960s. It is no 
surprise that the collectivist experimentalism of their European 
progenitors mutates under pressure from the managerial liberalism 
in ascendance in America during the first decades of the postwar 
period. World War II secured the belief that only through the 
mobilization of national resources and the renunciation of private 
interests could the threat of an equally collectivized and barbarous 
foe be resisted. The virtue of the free American individual may have 
been widely circulated at home and abroad through the loose 
encoding of abstract painting as individual expression, but avant-
garde futurism is a collaborative beast and requires infrastructure 
and finance to give it momentum and leverage. This is where the 
interdisciplinarity of the think-tankers and systems theorists, 
progressive educationalists, inventors and tinkerers converge with 
the design scientists, performance artists and social engineers -- on 
the ground cleared by a commitment to the scientific method, 
broadly understood as the processual interrogation of the limits of 
the known world. 
The 1960s art and tech labs make most sense when the 
commitment to collective enterprise is understood, not merely in its 
often-fearsome technocratic mode but in its recognition that 
complex societies require a degree of understanding that can only 
be collectively produced and maintained. This was the Progressive 
at the Pasadena Art Museum in 1963, much-cited as a watershed 
moment for West Coast artists.
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understanding of how science, as a stance toward the world and a 
method characterized by objectivity unslanted by class or ideology, 
might function for the public good. To be sure, what emerges with 
this conception of science with is the cult of the expert and of the 
bureaucrat, of conformity and the subordination of the individual to 
the demands of an often-reductive utilitarianism. But this 
assessment is too narrow and too beholden to the critique of the 
"man in the gray flannel suit" that grew out of the pinched 
instrumentalism of Cold War-era managerial culture, as if the 
answer to an overly regulated society is simply to release the 
individual from burdensome responsibilities. What was sometimes 
forgotten in the assaults on the "system" in the late 1960s and 
through the 1970s was the commitment to the possibility of an 
emancipatory technology, a collective imagination, and a belief in 
democratic government as the guarantor of prospective and 
redistributive forms of creativity. By locating the problems of 
democracy as systemic rather than political, the retreat from the 
notion of a collective, state-supported project of radical future-
building descended into the free-for-all of the contemporary 
neoliberal polity.
The ways in which explorative art and tech labs repurposed 
the avant-garde may indeed have facilitated their conscription into 
the service of corporate think tanks and a degraded popular culture, 
but to dismiss such projects merely as corporate art is to miss the 
broader engineering of consent taking place through the 
repurposing of "individual freedom" as the wrench that uncouples 
what used to be called the citizen from what is still, disparagingly, 
called the state. In the end, what mode of art best serves an 
acquisitive, amoral, post-national capitalism? An art of investigation 
conducted through process-oriented collaboration and committed to 
invention and experimentation? Or an art of competing signature 
styles hoarded by a global elite, circulated for public display in a 
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series of gilded palaces, and traded on the open market in displays 
of grotesque ostentation? If the contemporary art and tech labs are 
to be more than institutionally-supported start-ups for the next 
generation of Elon Musks, populated by ambitious interns and short-
term fellows, the radical roots of their 1960s precursors must be 
attended to as well as the understanding of science, democracy and 
the public that supported them. It is not enough to dismiss their 
"failure" as a mistaken dalliance with "the system" without an 
assessment of how the disrupted legacies of the historical and neo-
avant-gardes have, often simultaneously, replenished and 
undermined institutional experiments in art and tech knowledge 
exchange. Beyond questions of funding and complicity, though, 
what remains apparent is that the new labs continue to incubate, 
unreflectively, the contradictory nature of the enterprise. Without a 
politically utopian driver, it is hard to see what innovation in art and 
technology collaborations can be other than more product and more 
spectacle. The belief in experimenting a way out of any problem 
was both the best and worst aspect of 1960s labs and a fantasy that 
remains in the twenty-first century.
What is at stake in these art and technology labs reclaiming 
the proper names of their progenitors that we have examined in this 
article? A proper name indicates proprietary control, legal or 
otherwise. It invokes a singular. The “proper” of a proper name 
properly removes it from conflation with others while depending on 
those others for its ability to differentiate itself. This performance of 
a traveling shot of the history the art and technology labs through 
the reinscription of proper names simultaneously lays claim to the 
earlier instantiation’s aura of authenticity and draws attention to the 
proprietary claims being affected solely through quotation. That is, 
in seeking identification and continuity, the proper name reused 
(perhaps improperly) merely underscores the lab’s differences from 
its earlier self and reveals the name’s proprietary power manifested 
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as property: creative and intellectual property. The act of 
appropriation metastasizes into the appropriate: confronting 
contemporary conditions in a register worthy of them. The utopian 
desires of the neo-avant-gardes of the 1960s experimentations, for 
which Kepes and CAVS and many others serve as metonyms, might 
well be lurking in the current instantiations but the difficulties in 
detecting them result from their very strategically self-reflexive 
rhetorical moves that proffer a reactive gesture to a moment in 
which people were creative to remind us that such might be 
possible for us. They also offer us institutional instantiations of how 
the Cold War art and technology labs (as well as labs writ large) 
helped facilitate a shift from progressive liberalism to neoliberalism 
in the US.
Writing in the 1980s, Lyotard argues there is “a kind of 
collusion between capital and the avant-garde” due to the 
dependency of both on “the force of scepticism,” a mistrust of rules 
(and materials) and destruction of the status quo. (104-5). Capitalist 
economy relies on and is regulated by “an Idea,” that of pure wealth 
or power for which it offers no example from reality as proof. The 
Idea is merely posited. Indeed, through the operations of 
technologies that have made “science subordinate to itself,” he 
claims that reality has become “increasingly ungraspable, subject to 
doubt, unsteady” and thus aligned with avant-garde principles. 
(105) The artwork is no longer dependent on the state or a clearly 
delineated socio-cultural set of parameters but can emerge directly 
out of market economics. With the art and technology labs of the 
mid-century, and fundamentally the experiments at and that were 
Black Mountain, the artworks addressed the state and its aesthetic 
allowance. But as we have noted, the capacity of late capitalism and 
its market economics have sublimated this address and 
appropriated it for other ends, and not just those of the art market 
per se. Similarly it is worth considering to whom the current art and 
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technology labs address their works/experiments. Further if, they 
are directed towards consumer markets that largely elide the art 
market and that are bereft of state-directed demands other than 
that of innovation, where can that avant-garde position itself other 
than as a sign for appropriation? And, more to the point, how can an 
art and technology lab with a radical agenda succeed if it is 
underwritten by Bell Labs or SpaceX?
Adding experimentation (as rationale for the lab and the 
primary function of the lab) to a covert collusion between capitalism 
and the avant-garde further elaborates the shifts we have tried to 
trace here. Experimentation is a cultural technique that dominates 
the 19th and 20th centuries in ways that cannot be delinked from 
technology, the various measuring and tracing apparatuses that 
allowed for significantly altered ways of understanding the senses 
and their operation as well as the detection and measurement of 
natural phenomena far beyond what our corporeal senses can 
register. The site of experimentation (the lab) and its 
unquestionable connection to social progress meant that art and the 
lab were bound to find formal links, as Edison’s Menlo Park 
proleptically indicated. Experimentation in the 20th century 
maintains the experimental subject as passive agent under the 
control of formal scientific processes (e.g. hypothesis, controlled 
environments, standardized tools, measurable outcomes and 
academic scrutiny) but it also was seen as liberating the subject 
from the rules that bind its constitution and operation. This is the 
avant-garde, which asks what can we remove from 19th century 
aesthetics that claim and exemplify the autonomy of artistic 
production and still be able to call it art: medium, colors, mimesis, 
subject matter, mode of production, site of exhibition – all were 
removed or reconstituted as if in a kind of phenomenological 
reduction to art’s essence. Thus the lab as a site for both passive 
and active experimentation makes perfect sense both in the Cold 
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War and contemporary moments. But doing so within capital’s 
destructive impulses and then merely codifying experimentation as 
being suspicious of the rules marks it as cultural technique and a 
site of liberation that no longer is meant to further science or art or 
social progress but merely to generate enough innovation (enough 
difference) to convert appropriation once again into property. 
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